A new framework for detecting the short term fiscal vulnerability for the European Union countries by Stoian, Andreea et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A new framework for detecting the short
term fiscal vulnerability for the European
Union countries
Andreea Stoian and Laura Obreja Brasoveanu and Bogdan
Dumitrescu and Iulian Brasoveanu
Department of Finance and CEFIMO, Bucharest University of
Economic Studies, Department of Finance and CEFIMO, Bucharest
University of Economic Studies, Department of Banking, Bucharest
University of Economic Studies, Department of Finance and
CEFIMO, Bucharest University of Economic Studies
January 2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/63537/
MPRA Paper No. 63537, posted 19. April 2015 14:35 UTC
1 
 
A new framework for detecting the short term fiscal vulnerability for the European 
Union countries 
Andreea Stoian 
Department of Finance and CEFIMO 
Bucharest University of Economic Studies 
Laura Obreja Brașoveanu 
Department of Finance and CEFIMO 
Bucharest University of Economic Studies 
Bogdan Dumitrescu 
Department of Money and Banking and CARFIB 
Bucharest University of Economic Studies 
Iulian Brașoveanu 
Department of Finance and CEFIMO 
Bucharest University of Economic Studies 
 
Draft January 2015 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this study is to develop a new framework (V-L-D) for detecting the short term vulnerabilities in 
fiscal policy for the European Union countries. The methodology relies on two distinct indicators: one 
showing the vulnerabilities signalled by the size of the cyclically adjusted budget and public debt and one 
indicating the vulnerabilities through their annual changes. V-L-D is able to categorize fiscal vulnerability into 
five distinct classes having scores from 0 (no fiscal vulnerability) to 4 (extreme fiscal vulnerability). From 1990-
2013, we found 310 episodes of fiscal vulnerability for the 28 European Union countries out of which 128 
episodes of low vulnerability, 94 of moderate, 62 of strong and 26 of extreme fiscal vulnerability. We also 
explored the correlation between financial market sentiment and fiscal vulnerability. We used V-L-D as a 
predictor and Credit Default Swaps (CDS) as dependent and proxy for the market sentiment in a balanced panel 
model consisting in 17 European countries with random effects over the period 2008-2013. The results 
indicate that CDS are higher and significant for strong and extreme vulnerability periods compared with times 
having zero vulnerability. The CDS for low and moderate fiscal vulnerability are also higher but they are not 
significant, suggesting that investors overprice the risk randomly during low and moderate vulnerability. 
Employing a logit model for a panel consisting of 12 European countries over 2008-2013, we also found that 
governments are less likely to adjust fiscal policy when it is strong or extremely vulnerable and that the 
probability of fiscal consolidation increases when market sentiment is negative and CDS are higher.        
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1.Introduction 
For the last decades governments worldwide have been facing various and growing challenges of fiscal policy. 
Reassessing the role of the government in the economy after the Great Depression as the welfare state led to a 
significant increase in the social public spending which made overall government expenditures to rise. Adema, 
Fron and Ladaique (2011) showed in this sense that for the OECD countries the increase was of 20% over 
1980-2007 period. Earlier, Kotlikoff and Hagist (2005) documented that healthcare public spending increased 
more than GDP growth rate and they concluded that if social benefits continue increasing over the next 
decades at the same rate, then many governments will confront large and unsustainable budgetary deficits in 
the long run.  Corsetti and Roubini’s (1996) and Alesina’s (2000) argued about the negative effects of rising 
public social expenditures on fiscal sustainability. Fiscal policy issues have also been emphasized by an 
extended body of research. For instance, Wilcox (1989), Corsetti and Roubini (1991), Greiner and Semmler 
(1999), Afonso (2000), Afonso and Raul (2008) showed fiscal unsustainability in the long run, whereas Claeys 
(2007), Fatas and Mihov (2009), Afonso, Agnello, Furceri and Sousa (2009) indicated that fiscal position has 
not changed for the last 30 years and that fiscal policy has been mildly pro-cyclical. Recent literature (i.e. 
Ghosh, Kim, Mendoza, Ostry and Qureshi, 2011; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011) has also warned about the large 
increase in the primary deficits and public debt over the past forty years due to financial bailouts, lower 
government revenues and stimulus spending. 
These findings point towards the existence of some vulnerabilities in the fiscal policy which, unaddressed on 
short or medium term, could deteriorate its condition, hence, making it incapable to respond properly to 
various shocks or to achieve its objectives. Hemming, Kell and Schimmelpfennig (2003) showed that fiscal 
vulnerabilities were central in at least 6 of the 11 cases of crises that they investigated. In the cases of Russia 
and Ecuador, public sector solvency and liquidity problems culminated with the sovereign debt default, in 
Ukraine and Pakistan debt restructuring was negotiated under the shadow of default, and in the case of 
Bulgaria and Brazil, persistent and growing fiscal deficits were the main source of pressure on the currency.   
The financial crisis in 2007-2008 followed by the sharp economic recession and sovereign debt crisis brought 
into attention the importance of fiscal policy as a relevant macroeconomic policy tool used by governments 
to respond to shocks and/or to recover from the crisis. In this sense, many economists (i.e. Stiglitz, 2012; 
Pisani-Ferry, 2012) reasoned about the contribution of an expansionary fiscal policy towards a sustainable 
economic growth. This is more important for the Euro zone member states as they have limited 
macroeconomic policy tools since the monetary policy and the exchange rate can no longer be used by 
governments when dealing with shocks.   
In the light of the recent macroeconomic developments, the analytical work which has been conducted since 
2009 by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Commission (EC) reassessed the 
importance of employing a toolkit for detecting fiscal vulnerabilities and anticipating the potential stresses. 
Thus, the aim of this paper is to develop a new framework for detecting fiscal vulnerability on the short term 
for the European Union countries. For this purpose, the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
related literature. Section 3 defines the concept of fiscal vulnerability and describes the new proposed 
methodology, namely V-L-D. Section 4 provides the results and makes further discussions. Section 5 draws 
the concluding remarks of this study and some policy implications. 
 
2. Related literature 
Reviewing the relevant literature on this topic, we found several studies providing various frameworks or 
assessing fiscal vulnerabilities. In this respect, we believe that the paper of Hemming and Petrie (2000) 
represents the seminal work in the field. One important contribution brought by the two authors is that they 
formulated one explicit definition and presented and discussed the sources of fiscal vulnerability, also 
providing a comprehensive list of variables which could be considered for further assessment of fiscal 
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vulnerability. Later on, Rial and Vicente (2004) employed a sensitivity analysis in order to study the 
vulnerability of public debt in the case of Uruguay. The investigation conducted by the two authors is 
consistent with their own definition of fiscal vulnerability as representing any violation in liquidity and/or 
solvency requirements due to changes in the macroeconomic conditions. The methodology employed is 
appropriate for an economy like Uruguay which is confronted with high volatility in its macroeconomic 
conditions. They began the analysis from a baseline scenario and they defined additional scenarios assuming 
that the debt determinants (GDP growth rate, interest and exchange rate) vary (increase/decrease) by one and 
two standard deviations.          
The macroeconomic developments since 2008 which culminated with the sovereign debt crisis in the 
European Union, increased the interest in the study of fiscal vulnerability. Thus, the literature has grown over 
the last years. In this sense, Ghezzi, Keller and Wynne (2010) developed an index of fiscal vulnerability, which 
incorporates debt tolerance considerations by looking at five components of vulnerability: solvency (basic debt 
dynamics, i.e., whether the debt ratio is stable or increasing); fiscal financing needs and debt composition; 
external financing dependence; financial sector health; and institutional strength. The idea is that a judgment 
as to whether the debt dynamics point to a possible default depends in part on the other factors.  
Baldacci, McHucgh and Petrova (2011) contributed to the development of a fiscal monitoring framework by 
employing a fiscal vulnerability index which measures the fiscal vulnerability on a continuous basis as departure 
from historical norms defined as 10 years country averages and a fiscal stress index to assess the country 
susceptibility to extreme tail events. The fiscal vulnerability index was constructed using basic fiscal variables 
and variables indicating long term fiscal trends and assets and liabilities management. Each variable is 
standardized using the 10 years average and the standard deviation for each group of countries (advanced and 
emerging economies) and then transformed into cumulative normal distribution. The fiscal stress index was 
computed firstly by defining a fiscal crisis, secondly by assessing the signalling power of each indicator using 
the standard approach applied in the early warning systems and in the end by calculating the number of 
indicators exceeding the thresholds. The shortcomings of this methodology are also noticed by the authors 
and concern, on one hand, the meaning of the historical norms and deviations from them in the case of the 
vulnerability index and, on the other hand, the specific definition of crisis events in the case of the stress index. 
In a later study, Baldacci, Petrova, Belhocine, Dobrescu and Mazraani (2011) conducted a more detailed and 
extensive investigation on fiscal stress using the same methodology as presented in Baldacci, McHugh and 
Petrova (2011), but compared to the former one, they built the methodology on the basis of a broader 
definition of fiscal crisis which also included the public debt default as well as the near default events.  
BlackRock Investment Institute (2011) introduced the BlackRock Sovereign Risk Index for assessing the credit 
risk of sovereign debt issuers. They used several variables organized into four categories: fiscal space (debt 
level and structure, demography, default history, etc.); the external finance position; financial sector health; 
and willingness to pay (political and institutional factors). The index was computed using a weighted version 
of individual z-scores. This index proved to be highly correlated with the five-year Credit Default Swap (CDS) 
spreads. Hayes (2011) presented the Barclays Capital Fiscal Vulnerability Index (FVI) which was computed 
using 16 indicators of fiscal vulnerability across 57 countries. To assess fiscal vulnerability, a measure of 
financial market concerns about a country’s debt sustainability was chosen, namely the cost of insuring against 
a government defaulting on its bonds, as measured by Credit Default Swap rates. A higher CDS rate indicates 
that investors attach a higher likelihood to a government default, and they took this to indicate a heightened 
probability of a financing crisis. The choice of the vulnerability indicators and of the weights given to them in 
the overall FVI are determined by their ability to account for cross-country variation in CDS rates. The 
indicators are grouped under five broad headings: solvency, government financing needs, external financing 
dependence, financial sector health and institutional strength and the composite index (FVI) is reported as z-
score for each country. In Hayes’s view, a z-score is a measure of how far one country’s vulnerability is from 
the cross-country average and that it represents a rather relative measure of vulnerability than an absolute 
measure. A positive z-score indicates that the country’s fiscal resilience is above average, while a negative score 
indicates below average resilience.  
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Schaechter et al (2012) developed a broader toolkit for assessing fiscal vulnerability and risks. They introduced 
six tools organized by their time horizon: indicators measuring short time pressures including gross financing 
needs, market based measures of sovereign risk default (Credit Default Swap and Relative Asset Swap) and a 
measure of potential spillovers (distress dependence among sovereigns), and indicators assessing medium to 
long run vulnerabilities comprising of a measure of the fiscal effort required to stabilize debt (the size of fiscal 
consolidation required); a measure of assessing the adverse impact of growth and interest shocks to the debt 
trajectory and a measure of the debt outlook reflecting risks associated with the baseline debt projections. For 
each tool, a distinct estimation technique was employed.  Berti, Salto and Lequien (2012) presented an early 
warning index of fiscal stress named ‘S0’ that relies on non-parametric signals approach. They followed the 
existing definition of fiscal stress in order to study the key variables’ behavior ahead of these episodes. They 
chose a signalling window and made use of the optimization criterion for determining the thresholds for fiscal 
risk for each variable and for the composite indicator. Compared to previous studies using a similar 
methodology, their original contribution is represented by the introduction of competitiveness-financial 
variables.  
 
3. Short term fiscal vulnerability framework: methodological aspects 
Detecting fiscal vulnerability is rather difficult, but challenging. The existing literature has provided several 
frameworks for assessing fiscal vulnerability. The renewed focus of the IMF and the EC with this respect 
increased the interest in finding new ways of assessing the vulnerability of fiscal policy. In many of the previous 
studies, we found comprehensive and sophisticated techniques employed but, yet, they are not free of having 
some limitations. The contribution of this study is to provide a new framework on detecting vulnerability in 
the fiscal policy over the short term for the European Union countries. Much part of the relevant work in this 
field has focused on measuring or signalling fiscal vulnerability around episodes of fiscal crises defined, for 
example, as situations when there is a default or restructuring of the public debt or the governments benefit 
of an IMF supported program exceeding 100% of a country’s quota; or the inflation rate is excessively high; 
or the sovereign bond yields are exceptionally high (Baldacci, McHugh and Petrova, 2011; Baldacci, Petrova, 
Belhocine, Dobrescu and Mazraani, 2011; Berti, Salto and Lequien, 2012).  
Therefore, the aim of this research is to develop a new methodology being capable of detecting the 
vulnerabilities in fiscal policy over the short term, which do not necessarily imply an immediate fiscal stress 
(crisis). The following parable can illustrate this approach: imagine an individual who is running blood tests 
on annual basis in order to check the state of his health. The results can indicate a high level of sugar blood. 
He hasn’t been diagnosed as diabetic yet, he hasn’t collapsed yet, he hasn’t confronted any extreme state of 
health yet. But the blood tests point towards a vulnerability. The physician will recommend some treatment 
and will keep the patient under supervision in order to avoid any further complications. The patient takes the 
treatment and one year later he can find that the level of sugar blood decreased significantly and that the 
vulnerability (threat) passed.  
For the purpose of this study, one important step is to understand the concept of fiscal vulnerability. Much 
of the relevant literature was acknowledged in that sense (Furman and Stiglitz, 1999; Brixi, Shatalov and Zlaoui, 
2000; Hemming and Petrie, 2000; Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001; Allen, Rosenberg, Keller, Setser and 
Roubini, 2002;  Hemming, Kell and Shimmelpfennig, 2003; Rial and Vicente, 2004; Daniel, Davis, Fouad and 
Van Rijckeghem, 2006; Bruglio, Cordina, Farrugia and Vella, 2008; Aizenman and Pascricha, 2010; Frankel 
and Saravelos, 2010; Baldacci, McHugh and Petrova, 2011; Greene, 2011; Hayes, 2011; Leiner-Killinger, 2011; 
Jedrzejowicz and Kozinski, 2012; Missale, 2012). Fiscal vulnerability can be determined, on one hand, by 
inherent factors such as the poor size and the composition of government revenues and expenditures, poor 
structure of the public debt and, weak fiscal institutions, budgeting process, government assets and liabilities 
management etc. which can induce a kind of intrinsic vulnerabilities in the fiscal policy. If these weaknesses are 
nurtured by the governments over the years, for electoral or other policy and political purposes, and they do 
not foster economic growth, then the intrinsic vulnerabilities could self-fulfil into a fiscal crisis. On the other 
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hand, there are exogenous factors such as poor economic conditions, financial sector spillovers, demographic, 
political or environmental changes, etc. which are not specific to fiscal policy but which could generate 
exogenous vulnerabilities affecting the size and/or the dynamic of fiscal variables (e.g. the latest financial crisis 
of 2007-2008 required substantial government aid from the state budget which went to a significant growth 
in the public debt exposing fiscal policy to a higher degree of vulnerability).  
Studying the sources of fiscal vulnerability described in the existing literature (i.e.Hemming and Petrie, 2000; 
Cottarelli; Greene, 2011), the conclusion was that that their effects are eventually revealed by the size and/or 
by the changes of the budgetary deficit and/or of the public debt. In that sense, Stoian and Iorgulescu (2014) found 
that central and eastern European countries registered lower public debt-to-GDP ratios and higher debt 
growth rates compared to the advanced economies in EU. This evidence suggested that even if one country 
has a small size of public debt, when its dynamics is rapidly accelerating it should represent a signal for the 
governments to monitor its progress over the time and to adjust accordingly the primary surplus in order to 
avoid unstable debt trajectories on medium term and/or in the long run.  
Thus, fiscal vulnerability  can be defined as ‘any kind of intrinsic weakness in the existing fiscal policy or exogenous shocks 
that lead to a significant deterioration in the level and/or dynamics of the budgetary deficit and/or public debt over the short term 
that will limit the government’s ability to achieve its goals’.  
The newly developed framework for detecting fiscal vulnerability proposed in this study is consistent with this 
definition. We decomposed our measure of overall fiscal vulnerability (V) into two components, one capturing 
the vulnerability through the size of fiscal variables while the other captures the vulnerability through their 
changes on two consecutive years. The former we refer to as level indicator (L) while the second we refer to as 
the dynamic indicator (D). We used the cyclically adjusted balance and the public debt both as leading fiscal variables 
to detect the vulnerability. Establishing the measure of fiscal vulnerability is done throughout the equation (1): 
𝑉 = 𝐿 + 𝐷            (1) 
where, L  and  D  can take values of 0, 1 and 2 as it is described below.  
The level indicator (L) detects the vulnerabilities signalled by the size of the cyclically adjusted balance (CAB) and of 
the public debt through distance-to-stability (D-S). We argue the use the cyclically adjusted balance by two reasons. On 
one hand, it includes the interest payments on public debt from previous years, thus capturing the influence 
of past deficits, as sources of vulnerability, on the current fiscal policy. Even if governments make efforts in 
achieving primary surpluses, if the interest payments are sizeable they will turn the surplus into an overall 
deficit. Eventually, governments will have to borrow money or raise taxation in order to finance the overall 
deficit. On the other hand, variations in the budget balance can give a misleading picture of the fiscal stance 
as an improvement of the fiscal balance during the upswings can mask a deterioration in the underlying 
position of the public finances (Bouthevillain and Quinet, 1999). The distance-to-stability measure signals the 
possibility of current public debt to deviate from its steady state and to have an unstable trajectory in the 
medium term and/or in the long run if governments do not achieve sufficient primary surpluses or do not 
consolidate fiscal policy in order to reduce the deficit. The estimation of D-S is based on the public debt 
dynamic model which is detailed in Appendix 1. D-S measures the difference between the actual primary 
balance and the one needed to stabilize the public debt, given the real GDP growth rate and the interest rate 
on public debt. A fiscal vulnerability episode signalled by the size of the cyclically adjusted balance and/or of 
the public debt through D-S is defined in the year when CAB is larger than a specific threshold which is 
determined below and/or D-S is takes value of 1 as shown in the Appendix 1. 
The dynamics indicator (D) detects the vulnerabilities signalled by the changes for two consecutive years in the 
cyclically adjusted balance (CAB) and in the public debt (Debt), both expressed as GDP ratios. The period 
of two years used in the computation of the indicator of dynamic is chosen in order to diminish the influence 
of a temporary factor affecting the dynamic of the relevant indicators in one given year and to better picture 
their evolution that lead to the decision to initiate a fiscal adjustments. Moreover, taking into consideration a 
period of two consecutive years can capture large deterioration on short term in the leading indicators that led 
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to the decision to pursue the fiscal adjustment and it eventually excludes the medium term developments in 
the leading indicators that are not necessarily linked to the decision to embark the adjustment of fiscal policy. 
Raising ratios suggests that CAB and/or public debt increase faster than GDP does. A fiscal vulnerability episode 
signalled by the dynamic of cyclically adjusted balance and/or by the dynamic of public debt is defined in the 
year when the cumulated changes over two consecutive years in fiscal variables are larger than a specific 
threshold. 
In order to establish a relevant threshold beyond which the size of the cyclically adjusted balance as well as 
changes in CAB and in public debt as GDP ratios  indicate fiscal vulnerability the following approach was 
employed. We focused on countries which consolidated fiscal policy in order to correct the imbalances. 
However, we fully acknowledge that some countries could decide, for various reasons, not to tackle firmly 
their fiscal problems and to increase the deficit and/or to accumulate debt instead, arguing that they have the 
necessary fiscal space. Nevertheless, according to the ‘crisis hypothesis’, governments find much easier to 
stabilize decisively in times of crisis than in times of moderate economic problems (Alesina, Ardagna and 
Trebbi, 2006).  
We studied the size of the cyclically adjusted budget and the cumulated changes for two consecutive years in 
CAB and in public debt to GDP ratios in the year before the fiscal adjustment episodes by the reason we 
assumed that all these indicators reached a level which triggered on average the fiscal consolidation.  
A period of fiscal adjustments was defined as a period of few consecutive years characterized by small improvements in the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance, which includes at least one year when the improvement was at least 1.5 per cent of GDP as 
in Alesina and Ardagna (2010), or a period of few consecutive years when the average improvement in the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance is at least 1 per cent of GDP per year.  
Using annual data over the period 1990-2013 for 28 EU countries, we found 64 episodes of fiscal adjustments 
(see Table 1 in the Appendix 2). The dataset used for detecting fiscal adjustments is descried in the Appendix 
3. Studying the values for CAB, CAB and Debt in the preceding year of the fiscal adjustment, we calculated 
the median in order to establish the threshold which indicate fiscal vulnerability. Choosing median as a relevant 
estimator for the purpose of this study was argued by the reason of eliminating the influence of large values 
recorded for some countries due, mostly, to specific circumstances. Ireland, for example, registered a 47 p.p. 
deterioration in the public debt to GDP ratio in 2010 compared to 2008 and a 20 p.p. deterioration of the 
CAB compared to the previous year and clearly represents an outlier. The following thresholds were evidenced: 
(i) a deficit of 4.7 p.p. of GDP for the cyclically adjusted budget balance; (ii) a deterioration of the CAB of 2.3 
p.p. of GDP for two consecutive years, and (iii) an increase of the public debt to GDP ratio of 6.1 p.p. of 
GDP for two consecutive years. In order to detect fiscal vulnerability, we looked for values larger than the 
median from the upper 50% of data distribution. The level indicator (L) monitoring the vulnerability signalled 
by the size of the cyclically adjusted balance by the size of public debt through the distance-to-stability takes the 
following values: 
𝐿 = {
2, 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐴𝐵 ≤ −4.7 𝑝. 𝑝. 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷 − 𝑆 = 1,
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐴𝐵 ≤ −4.7 𝑝. 𝑝. 𝑜𝑟 𝐷 − 𝑆 = 1,
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐴𝐵 > 4.7 𝑝. 𝑝. 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷 − 𝑆 = 0
       (2) 
The dynamics indicator (D) monitoring the vulnerability signalled by the changes for two consecutive years in 
CAB and in the public debt years takes the following values: 
𝐷 = {
2, 𝑖𝑓 ∆𝐶𝐴𝐵 ≥ 2.3 𝑝. 𝑝. 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 ≥ 6.1 𝑝. 𝑝. ,
1, 𝑖𝑓 ∆𝐶𝐴𝐵 ≥ 2.3 𝑝. 𝑝. 𝑜𝑟 ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 ≥ 6.1 𝑝. 𝑝. ,
0, 𝑖𝑓 ∆𝐶𝐴𝐵 < 2.3 𝑝. 𝑝. 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 < 6.1𝑝. 𝑝.
      (3) 
Finally, using V-L-D framework, five categories of fiscal vulnerability (V) can be established as in (4): 
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𝑉 =
{
 
 
 
 
4, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
3, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
2, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦,
1, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
0, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑛𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
      (4) 
For instance, when V-L-D indicates extreme fiscal vulnerability, it implies that both the level and the dynamics 
indicators signal vulnerabilities in the fiscal policy. In this situations, fiscal consolidation is strongly required. 
When V is zero, the situation corresponds with states of non-vulnerability. When V takes values of 3, 2 or 1, 
both and/or only one of the indicators (L or D) detect vulnerabilities in fiscal policy. V-L-D framework has 
the advantage of detecting fiscal vulnerability over the short term using data reported for the current year and 
for the previous two years. Thus, governments could use the information provided by V-L-D in order to 
correct the fiscal policy for the next year or during the same year, if there is enough data to calculate V. We 
also believe that V-L-D represents a tool which allows governments to make fiscal adjustments in real time. 
Human beings have a natural disposition to procrastinate the moments when they have to make changes. This 
is also true for governments’ behaviour which prefer to postpone the fiscal consolidation.  Buiter (2004) 
explaining why policy makers prefer running Ponzi schemes and roll over the public debt instead of smoothly 
adjusting fiscal policy argued that when there is no terminal date, or even if there is one but it is far in the 
future and there is an obvious temptation for a debtor to put off the day of reckoning as long as possible and 
even after 200 years of deficits the debtor can always argue that it has all the rest of eternity to run the necessary 
primary surpluses. A forward looking methodology of assessing fiscal vulnerability would indicate the potential 
risks at which fiscal policy could be exposed only a few years later. It depends only on the governments to 
decide whether they make the necessary adjustment to avoid the long term risks. When V-L-D signals the 
fiscal vulnerability, it also warns governments that fiscal policy should be adjusted.   
 
4. Results and discussions 
The V-L-D framework for detecting short term overall fiscal vulnerability for the EU countries was employed 
on a dataset over the period 1990-2013 for 28 countries of the European Union. The data set is described in 
the Appendix 3. The total number of observations was 516. V-L-D indicated 310 episodes (years) of fiscal 
vulnerability out of which 26 episodes of extreme vulnerability, 62 episodes of strong vulnerability,  94 
episodes of moderate vulnerability and 128 episodes of low vulnerability (see Table 2 in the Appendix 2). For 
the rest of 206 observations, V-L-D detected no fiscal vulnerability: Studying the overall vulnerability for 2014 
and 2015 (see Table 3 and Table 4 in the Appendix 2), we can observe that in 2014 only for Greece, the V-L-
D detected strong fiscal vulnerability, whilst in 2015 Slovenia is the only country indicated as having strong 
fiscal vulnerability. For rest of the European Union countries, our framework mostly indicates low and 
moderate vulnerability. Analysing the decomposed vulnerability for Greece’s case in 2014, we find that the 
dynamic indicator (D) shows increases in the cyclically adjusted balance and public debt-to-GDP ratios for 
the last two years whereas the level indicator signals stabilizing debt issues. This is the information which V-
L-D provides. What should Greek government do with it? The distance-to-stability suggests that public debt still 
diverges from the steady state and not addressing this aspect by reaching larger primary surplus could 
deteriorate fiscal sustainability. Also the cumulated changes in the debt ratio show an appropriate dynamic in 
short run. The overall fiscal vulnerability in 2015 decreases from 3 to 1 with zero vulnerability for the size and 
changes in the public debt. This indicates that Greek governments will take serious measures in order to 
decrease the debt ratio. The forecast show that in 2015 debt will reduce from 175% to GDP in 2014 to 168% 
to GDP reaching to 157% to GDP in 2016 according to the data provided by Ameco. However, the dynamic 
indicator still detects some vulnerabilities for the cyclically adjusted balance and its changes over the last two 
years. Therefore, this aspect should be further monitor by Greek governments and eventually avoid increasing 
the deficit before it can be signalled by the level indicator.      
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In order to check if V-L-D sends the right signals, we explored the correlation between the financial markets 
sentiment and the V-L-D results for overall fiscal vulnerability as predictor. For this purpose, we employed a 
balanced panel model with random effects and one categorical variable over the period 2008-2013. The model 
is described by equation (5):  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽𝑗𝐷𝑗 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡          (5) 
where: 
Yit is the Credit Default Swap defined as dependent variable for country i at time t; 
Dj  is overall fiscal vulnerability which takes values of 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4 and it is defined as a categorical variable, 
𝑗 = 0,4̅̅ ̅̅ ; 
Zit: set of control variables for country i at time t represented by the nominal GDP growth rate and by the 
trade deficit; 
α is the constant; 
βj  is the coefficient of category j of factor variable; 
γ is the coefficient of control variable; 
εit is the error term. 
The five-years CDS in US dollars at the end of the year used as a dependent variable in the equation (5) is a 
proxy for the market sentiment. The categorical variable (vulnerability) is the variable of interest and is 
represented by V as in equation (4). Being a categorical variable it is displayed in 5 distinct categories depending 
on the vulnerability score. Some descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2. The nominal GDP growth rate 
(growth) accounting for the domestic economic condition and the trade deficit of goods and services as GDP 
ratio (external) accounting for the external imbalances were introduced as control variables. The use of control 
variables was argued by robustness check reasons.  
Table 2   Fiscal vulnerability categories, 2008-2013 
Vulnerability      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
          0          16       15.69       15.69 
          1          22       21.57       37.25 
          2          28       27.45       64.71 
          3          24       23.53       88.24 
          4          12       11.76      100.00 
      Total         102                  100.00 
The panel consists of 17 EU countries: Bulgaria, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Finland, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden for which 
we found available data during 2008-2013. The data for CDS was collected from Reuters and the data for the 
GDP growth rate and for the trade deficit were provided by Ameco. 
Three distinct equations were estimated. In the first regression (5.1), only the correlation between the market 
sentiment and the fiscal vulnerability was explored. In the second (5.2) and the third regression (5.2), control 
variables were added in order to check if the relationship between market sentiment and the fiscal vulnerability 
still holds. Investors could ask for a higher risk premium not only when they believe that governments 
confront with an increased exposure to solvency risk due to debt accumulation, but also when the economic 
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conditions are bad and when the countries are exposed to external shocks due to a poor trade balance also 
combined with a deterioration of fiscal conditions.   
𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽𝑗𝐷𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡          (5.1) 
𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽𝑗𝐷𝑗 + 𝛾𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (5.2) 
𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽𝑗𝐷𝑗 + 𝛾1𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (5.3) 
The panel was estimated using GLS method and random effects as indicated by the Hausman test and using 
zero fiscal vulnerability as the base category for the categorical variable. The results are reported in Table 3.  
Table 3   Random effects GLS regression 
 Panel 1 
Variables    (1)    (2)    (3) 
Vulnerability    
1 -16.62 10.41 8.006 
 (60.21) (58.61) (59.12) 
2 53.85 100.7* 94.55 
 (59.03) (59.07) (58.80) 
3 99.41* 144.1** 138.0** 
 (60.16) (59.87) (59.74) 
4 118.1* 193.1*** 200.9*** 
 (71.28) (73.51) (74.21) 
growth  9.666*** 7.059* 
  (3.293) (3.661) 
external   -6.538** 
   (3.168) 
 148.9*** 91.59* 106.1** 
constant (50.59) (52.84) (50.95) 
Hausman test 
Prob>χ2 
 
0.1764 
 
0.5661 
 
0.3661 
R-sq 0.0914 0.1623 0.2093 
 Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results show that financial markets react to strong and extreme fiscal vulnerability by increasing the CDS. 
These two categories are significant for each regression employed suggesting a robust relationship between 
market sentiment and a heavy deterioration of the fiscal policy. When using a categorical variable as 
explanatory, a base category has to be set up for comparison. Thus, the estimated coefficients indicate how 
much the dependent variable corresponding to category j is larger than the dependent variable corresponding 
to the base category. Taking, for instance, regression (5.3) as an example, the coefficients indicate that CDS in 
situation of extreme fiscal vulnerability (denoted by category 4) is 200 points higher than CDS in situations 
when fiscal policy is not vulnerable. The CDS for categories 3 and 4 of fiscal vulnerability are larger than the 
CDS for the base category and are statistically significant and hold for all regressions. Concerning the 
categories of low (1) and moderate (2) fiscal vulnerability, the panel indicates that even if CDS are higher 
compared with the base category (zero vulnerability), the coefficients are not statistically significant. This 
suggests that investors’ beliefs concerning the risk induced by low and moderate fiscal vulnerability are 
somehow similar with the situation when fiscal policy is not vulnerable. Thus, they don’t systemically ask for 
higher risk premium during periods with low and moderate vulnerability as they do for situations when fiscal 
policy is signalled as being strong or extremely vulnerable, but randomly. These findings are consistent with 
De Grauwe and Ji (2012) who suggested that during boom years, investors are pricing favourable the sovereign 
risk compared with times of crisis when, driven by panic, they usually overprice the risk. The authors also 
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advocate that financial markets behaviour influences governments’ response to fiscal vulnerability. During 
economic flourishing when investors are optimistic and are more prone to underpricing the risk, governments 
are not stimulated to adjust fiscal policy even if it gives signal of vulnerability.   Large deterioration of economic 
and of fiscal conditions which are assessed as fiscal stress lead to a change in market sentiment in the sense of 
increasing sovereign risk. Thus, government will have to consolidate fiscal policy.  
We also studied government’s reaction of adjusting fiscal policy in times of vulnerability. In this sense, we 
employed a logit model for balanced panel data using as dependent a dummy variable (adjustment) which takes 
value of 1 for the years when we identified episodes of fiscal adjustments (see Table 1 in the Appendix 2) and 
0 otherwise. Equation (6) describes the model: 
 
Pr (𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 𝐹(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡)         (6) 
where: 
Yit is the dependent variable describing the fiscal adjustment for country i and time t which takes values of 0 
and 1; 
Xit is the set of explanatory variable for country i and time t represented by the overall adjusted vulnerability 
or the CDS; 
β0, β1 represent the coefficients to be estimated. 
Two distinct equations were estimated. Equation (6.1) investigates whether the probability of adjusting fiscal 
policy increases with the change in the status of overall fiscal vulnerability from one category to another. This 
should be consistent with the ‘crisis hypotheses’. Thus, we used as predictor a categorical variable (adjusted 
vulnerability) with 2 distinct categories: 0 and 1. The decision to reshape the original categorical variable 
(vulnerability) used in Panel 1 lied on previous results which made us conclude that financial markets find more 
relevant the situations characterized by strong and extreme vulnerability. This new variable which was 
introduced in equation (6.1) aims at revealing if the probability of adjusting fiscal policy increases when fiscal 
vulnerability changes from low and moderate to strong and extreme. In this case, the base is represented by 
the zero category which corresponds to low and moderate fiscal vulnerability.  Equation (6.2) explores the 
correlation between the probability of taking fiscal consolidation when fiscal policy is vulnerable, but also 
controlling for the market sentiment (CDS). 
Pr (𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 1|adjusted 𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗) = 𝐹(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗) (6.1) 
Pr (𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡) = 𝐹(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡) (6.2) 
Both equations are estimated using a balanced panel data consisting of 12 European Union countries: 
Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Spain over 2008-2013 period. Compared to panel 1, from panel 2 we dropped Bulgaria, Finland, France, 
Ireland and Sweden for which we observed no change in adjustment or in adjusted vulnerability during the period 
investigated. We used annual average for CDS assuming that it will be more relevant for our investigation, if 
we take into account that fiscal adjustments could be undertaken throughout the year. The results are reported 
in Table 4: 
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Table 4   Random effects logit regression 
 Panel 2           Odds ratio 
Variables (1) ( 2) (1)              (2) 
adjusted vulnerability    
1 -1.951*** -3.748***             0.142***      0.023*** 
 (0.714) (1.070)              (0.101)          (0.025) 
CDS  0.0134***                                  1.013*** 
  (0.00397)                                    (0.004) 
constant 0.526 -1.147**             1.692            0.317** 
 (0.373) (0.519)               (0.630)         (0.164) 
    
Observations 72 72  
    
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results indicate that the probability of consolidating fiscal policy when vulnerability goes from ‘low and 
moderate’ to ‘strong and extreme’ decreases. When adding the control variable, we find that the odds of taking 
fiscal adjustments increase when the market sentiment becomes poorer. This result is consistent with De 
Grauwe and Ji (2012)’ who suggested that governments are more willing to consolidate when market sentiment 
is negative. Our findings do not reject the ‘crisis hypothesis’. They just show that governments are less likely 
to take fiscal adjustments in times of strong and extreme vulnerability. According to our observations of the 
data (see Table 5 in the Appendix 2), governments consolidate fiscal policy within few years after strong and 
extreme vulnerability episodes, when cautious investors are still pricing high the sovereign risk and CDS are 
still large. This is the reason why we found lower probability of consolidation in times of strong and extreme 
vulnerability and higher probability when CDS are raising. Moreover, the theory also suggests the existence of 
various lags (recognition, decision, implementation, and impact) between the time when the problem occurs 
and the time when policy responds. We can also assume that over periods with fiscal stress, governments 
might adjust fiscal policy in the sense of a slight improvement of the adjusted primary balance but not in the 
sense defined in this paper or in the sense found in the literature.   
 
5.Conclusions 
Along with the increased interest in assessing fiscal vulnerability for the last years, this paper made its 
contribution by introducing a new framework (V-L-D) for detecting short term fiscal vulnerability for the 
European Union countries. V-L-D consists of two indicators: one level indicator signalling the vulnerabilities 
coming from the size of the cyclically adjusted balance and the public debt and one dynamic indicator 
capturing the vulnerabilities generated by their changes in the short run. Many of the existing studies 
researching the assessment of fiscal vulnerability have relied on identifying thresholds for various fiscal or 
financial variables thought to influence fiscal vulnerability, but many of these thresholds have been estimated 
based on historical norms. In return, our research provides a fiscal vulnerability indicator which is constructed 
using thresholds that are identified from periods when governments decided to pursue on fiscal consolidation 
implying that they confronted some kind of fiscal distress which did not necessarily led to a fiscal crisis.  
The V-L-D categorizes fiscal vulnerability into five classes having scores from zero, which corresponds to 
non-vulnerability up to 4 which indicate extreme fiscal vulnerability. V-L-D detects short term fiscal 
vulnerability because it relies on data collected for the current year and for previous two years. We believe that 
governments are short sighted and even if the forward-looking methodologies of assessing fiscal vulnerability 
detect some vulnerabilities over the next few years, governments will generally not consolidate fiscal policy in 
the present to address in advanced that particular issue, but when the distress cannot be avoided anymore. 
This is the reason why, we decided to emphasize more what happened in the recent past. Governments could 
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use the information provided by V-L-D in order to make changes in fiscal policy to avoid increasing exposure 
to various risks. Additionally, V-L-D could provide useful information for investors when pricing the 
sovereign risk.  
In order to test the relevance and the usefulness of this framework, we explored the correlation between 
financial market sentiment and fiscal vulnerability. We conducted this investigation on a balanced panel of 17 
EU countries during 2008-2013. The results showed that market sentiment turns negative when fiscal policy 
is strongly or extremely vulnerable. Thus, the investors will increase CDS spreads asking for higher risk 
premium when fiscal conditions are severely deteriorating.  
Additionally, we employed a logit panel model with random effects in order to explore if governments are 
adjusting fiscal policy when it is signalled as vulnerable. Using a panel of 12 EU countries during 2008-2013, 
we found that governments are less likely to adjust during strong and extreme fiscal vulnerability, but more 
prone to adjustment when market sentiment becomes negative and when the CDS are increasing. 
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APPENDIX 1: Distance-to-Stability (DS) 
The dynamics of public debt can be described starting with the one period budget constraint: 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝑖 ∙ 𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝐵𝑡          (1) 
where: Bt/t-1 = nominal general government debt at the end of year t/t-1; I = nominal interest rate paid on 
government debt; PB = primary balance which equals primary government expenditures less tax revenues. 
The dynamics of public debt-to-GDP ratio can be derived from equation (1) by division through Yt: 
𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
−
𝐵𝑡−1∙𝑌𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1∙𝑌𝑡
= 𝑖 ∙
𝐵𝑡−1∙𝑌𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1∙𝑌𝑡
+
𝑃𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
         (2) 
where Yt=GDP at current prices. 
With small letters for ratios to GDP and y the growth rate of nominal GDP, equation (2) can be rewritten as:  
𝑏𝑡 − 𝑏𝑡−1 ∙
1
1+𝑦
= 𝑏𝑡−1 ∙
𝑖
1+𝑦
+ 𝑝𝑏𝑡         (3) 
Hence, the public debt ratio evolves according to: 
𝑏𝑡 =
1+𝑖
1+𝑦
∙ 𝑏𝑡−1 + 𝑝𝑏𝑡           (4) 
Now, if government aims at stabilizing the public debt, the condition is that: 𝑏𝑡 = 𝑏𝑡−1 which is consistent 
with the steady state of public debt to GDP ratio. Keeping the debt on a stable trajectory avoids or diminish 
the risk of running an unsustainable fiscal policy in the long run: 
𝑏𝑡 =
1+𝑖
1+𝑦
∙ 𝑏𝑡 + 𝑝𝑏𝑡              (5) 
Using equation (5), we can estimate the primary balance (pbt
*) which allows fulfilling the debt stabilization as 
in: 
𝑝𝑏𝑡
∗ =
𝑖−𝑦
1+𝑦
∙ 𝑏𝑡              (6) 
The distance-to-stability represent the difference between the actual and the stabilizing primary balance: 
𝐷 − 𝑆 = 𝑝𝑏𝑡 − 𝑝𝑏𝑡
∗              (7) 
It indicates if governments are able to achieve the required primary surplus in order to avoid putting the debt 
on an unstable path. If D-S is negative, this can create the condition that the public debt to diverge from its 
steady state. Thus, we have two distinct situations: 
𝐷 − 𝑆 = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑏𝑡 ≥ 𝑝𝑏𝑡
∗
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑏𝑡 < 𝑝𝑏𝑡
∗              (8)   
In the case when D-S takes value 0 this indicates that governments managed to stabilize public debt and the 
absence of fiscal vulnerability and when D-S takes value 1 this show that the government failed in achieving 
stabilization and that the level of public debt could induce fiscal discomfort due to a temporarily departure 
from its steady state. 
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APPENDIX 2: Tables 
 
Table 1   Fiscal adjustments episodes, 1990-2013 
Country Year Country Year 
Belgium 1993; 2006; 2012:2013 Lithuania 2010:2013 
Bulgaria 2003:2004; 2010:2012 Luxembourg 2000:2001; 2005:2008 
Czech Republic 2004; 2010:2013 Hungary 1999:2000; 2003:2004; 
2007:2012 
Denmark 2003:2004; 2013 Malta 1999:2000; 2004:2005; 2009 
Germany 1992:1994; 1996; 2000; 
2011:2012 
The Netherlands 1993; 1996; 2004:2005; 
2011:2013 
Estonia 2000; 2009:2010 Austria 1996:1997; 2001; 2005; 
2011:2013 
Ireland 2000; 2003:2004; 2011:2013 Poland 2011:2012 
Greece 1991; 1996; 2005; 2010:2011 Portugal 1992; 2003:2004; 2006:2007; 
2011:2013 
Spain 1996:1997; 2010:2013 Romania 2010:2012 
France 1996; 2011:2013 Slovenia 2012 
Croatia 2012:2013 Slovakia 2011:2013 
Italy 1991:1993: 1995:1997; 2007; 
2011:2013 
Finland 1996:1998; 2000 
Cyprus 2000; 2004:2007; 2012:2013 Sweden 1996:1998; 2000 
Latvia 2000:2001; 2009:2012 United Kingdom 1994:1998; 2001; 2010:2012 
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Table 2   Episodes of fiscal vulnerability, 1990-2013 
Country Extreme- Year(s) Strong– Year(s) Moderate- Year(s) Low – Year(s) 
Belgium - 1993; 2009 1992 1994; 1996; 2005; 
2010:2013 
Bulgaria - - 2009 2010:2013 
Czech Republic 2001:2002 2009 2003; 2010:2012 1999:2000; 2004:2006; 
2008; 2013 
Denmark - 2010 1993; 2009 1992; 1994; 2011:2012 
Germany 1995 2010 1993; 1996; 2002; 
2009 
1994; 1997:1999; 
2001; 2003:2005 
Estonia - - 1999; 2008 1998; 2009; 2012 
Ireland 2008:2010 2011:2013 - 2002; 2007 
Greece 2009 1992:1993; 
2004:2005; 2008; 
2010:2011 
1994; 2001; 
2006:2007; 
2012:2013 
1995:1997; 2000; 2003 
Spain 2009 2008; 2010:2012 2013 - 
France - 1993; 1995; 2003; 
2009:2010 
1992; 1994; 1996; 
2011:2013 
1990:1991; 1997:1998; 
2002; 2004:2005; 2008 
Croatia - 2011 2011:2012 - 
Italy - 1992:1994 1990:1991; 1996; 
2005; 2009:2010; 
2012:2013 
1995; 2001; 2003; 
2006; 2008; 2011 
Cyprus 2003; 2010 2009; 2011:2012 2013 2002 
Latvia 2008 2009 1999; 2010 2000:2003; 2007 
Lithuania 2009 2008 1999:2000; 
2010:2011 
2001:2002; 2012:2013 
Luxembourg - - 1992; 2009 2002:2004; 2008 
Hungary 2006 2002:2003 2004:2005; 
2007:2010 
1999; 2012 
Malta 1997; 2003 1998:1999; 2008 1996; 2004;  2000:2002; 2009; 
2011:2012 
The Netherlands - 1995; 2009 2002; 2010l 
2012:2013 
1992:1993; 2003:2004; 
2008; 2011 
Austria - 1995; 2009:2010 1994; 2004 1993; 1996:1997; 
2003; 2012:2013 
Poland 2010 2009 2003; 2008 1997:1998; 2001:2002; 
2004:2006; 2012:2013 
Portugal 2005; 2009:2010 1994 1993; 1995:1996; 
2001:2002; 2006; 
2011:2013 
1992; 1998; 
2003:2004; 2008 
Romania 2009 2007:2008; 
2010:2011 
2012 2006 
Slovenia 2013 2009:2011 2012 2000:2001; 2003:2005; 
2008 
Slovakia 2000; 2010 1999; 2009 2001:2002; 
2011:2013 
2008 
Finland - 1992:1993; 
2009:2010;  
1991; 1994; 2013 1995:1996; 2012 
Sweden - - - 1996; 2002; 2009; 
2011; 2013 
United Kingdom 1993; 2009:2010 1992; 1994; 2008; 
2011 
1995; 2002:2003; 
2012:2013 
1996; 2004:2007 
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Table 3   Fiscal vulnerability in 2014 
Country 
Overall 
vulnerability 
(V) 
Distance-
to-
stability 
(D-S) 
Cyclically 
adjusted 
balance 
(CAB) 
Changes 
in 
public 
debt 
(Debt) 
Changes 
in CAB 
(CAB) 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 1 0 0 1 0 
Czech Republic 1 0 0 0 1 
Denmark 1 0 0 0 1 
Germany 1 1 0 0 0 
Estonia 1 1 0 0 0 
Ireland 2 1 0 0 1 
Greece 3 1 0 1 1 
Spain 2 0 0 1 1 
France 0 0 0 0 0 
Croatia 1 0 0 1 0 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 
Cyprus 2 0 0 1 1 
Latvia 1 1 0 0 0 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 
Hungary 1 1 0 0 0 
Malta 1 1 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 
Austria 2 1 0 1 0 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 1 1 0 0 0 
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia 2 1 0 1 0 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 1 0 0 1 0 
Sweden 1 1 0 0 0 
United Kingdom 1 0 1 0 0 
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Table 4   Fiscal vulnerability in 2015 
Country 
Overall 
vulnerability 
(V) 
Distance-
to-
stability 
(D-S) 
Cyclically 
adjusted 
balance 
(CAB) 
Changes 
in 
public 
debt 
(Debt) 
Changes 
in CAB 
(CAB) 
Belgium 1 1 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 2 1 0 1 0 
Czech Republic 1 1 0 0 0 
Denmark 1 1 0 0 0 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 
Estonia 1 1 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 
Greece 1 0 0 0 1 
Spain 2 1 0 1 0 
France 1 1 0 0 0 
Croatia 2 1 0 1 0 
Italy 1 1 0 0 0 
Cyprus 2 1 0 1 0 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 1 1 0 0 0 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 
Poland 1 1 0 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 
Romania 1 1 0 0 0 
Slovenia 3 1 0 1 1 
Slovakia 1 1 0 0 0 
Finland 1 1 0 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 
United Kingdom 1 1 0 0 0 
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Table 5   Credit Default Swaps, Fiscal vulnerability, Fiscal adjustments, 2008-2013 
Year Country CDS 
Fiscal 
vulnerability 
Fiscal 
adjustment 
2008 Denmark 108.29 No No 
2009 Denmark 57.89 No No 
2010 Denmark 29.10 Yes No 
2011 Denmark 63.72 No No 
2012 Denmark 80.01 No No 
2013 Denmark 17.61 No Yes 
2008 Netherlands 25.48 No No 
2009 Netherlands 55.66 Yes No 
2010 Netherlands 44.60 No No 
2011 Netherlands 62.73 No Yes 
2012 Netherlands 66.00 No Yes 
2013 Netherlands 115.18 No Yes 
2008 France 50.93 No No 
2009 France 40.81 Yes No 
2010 France 66.28 Yes No 
2011 France 72.63 No Yes 
2012 France 72.63 No Yes 
2013 France 72.63 No Yes 
2008 Germany 15.24 No No 
2009 Germany 37.47 No No 
2010 Germany 39.77 Yes No 
2011 Germany 65.58 No Yes 
2012 Germany 68.61 No Yes 
2013 Germany 30.70 No No 
2008 Latvia 332.26 Yes No 
2009 Latvia 703.82 Yes Yes 
2010 Latvia 360.27 No Yes 
2011 Latvia 258.60 No Yes 
2012 Latvia 232.56 No Yes 
2013 Latvia 114.23 No No 
2008 Lithuania 247.59 Yes No 
2009 Lithuania 484.02 Yes No 
2010 Lithuania 262.39 No Yes 
2011 Lithuania 258.24 No Yes 
2012 Lithuania 222.45 No Yes 
2013 Lithuania 118.27 No Yes 
2008 Poland 98.22 No No 
2009 Poland 190.42 Yes No 
2010 Poland 131.24 Yes No 
2011 Poland 193.17 No Yes 
2012 Poland 172.81 No Yes 
2013 Poland 86.43 No No 
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Table 5 (continued)  
Year Country CDS 
Fiscal 
vulnerability 
Fiscal 
adjustment 
2008 Portugal 51.10 No No 
2009 Portugal 80.21 Yes No 
2010 Portugal 291.49 Yes No 
2011 Portugal 852.11 No Yes 
2012 Portugal 880.92 No Yes 
2013 Portugal 392.98 No Yes 
2008 Romania 301.21 Yes No 
2009 Romania 388.82 Yes No 
2010 Romania 298.25 Yes Yes 
2011 Romania 310.59 Yes Yes 
2012 Romania 344.15 No Yes 
2013 Romania 198.85 No No 
2008 Slovakia 55.37 No No 
2009 Slovakia 106.00 Yes No 
2010 Slovakia 79.55 Yes No 
2011 Slovakia 147.84 No Yes 
2012 Slovakia 205.34 No Yes 
2013 Slovakia 90.20 No Yes 
2008 Slovenia 50.30 No No 
2009 Slovenia 98.78 Yes No 
2010 Slovenia 72.68 Yes No 
2011 Slovenia 174.57 Yes No 
2012 Slovenia 361.21 No Yes 
2013 Slovenia 296.97 Yes No 
2008 Spain 66.49 Yes No 
2009 Spain 93.12 Yes No 
2010 Spain 203.44 Yes Yes 
2011 Spain 318.19 Yes Yes 
2012 Spain 426.15 Yes Yes 
2013 Spain 232.96 No Yes 
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APPENDIX 3: Dataset  
For the purpose of our study we used a dataset consisting in annual data for several key fiscal variables for 28 
countries of the European Union. The data was provided by Ameco. The complete list of the variables 
included in our investigation is presented below: 
(1) Variables used for calculating distance-to-stability:  
 bt is the general consolidated gross debt-to-GDP ratio at time t; 
 pbt is the primary balance-to-GDP ratio at time t (net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)); 
 y is the GDP growth rate calculated as the percentage variation of the GDP; 
 i is the implicit interest rate on public debt (the interest payments for current year ratio to the public 
debt from previous year). 
(2) Variables used for identifying the fiscal adjustments episodes: 
 Cyclically adjusted primary balance percentage to potential GDP. 
(3) Variables used in calculating V employing V-L-D framework: 
 General government consolidated gross debt-to-GDP ratio; 
 Cyclically adjusted balance percentage to potential GDP. 
The dataset ranges from 1990 to 2013. But, considering that our investigation develops on multiple layers, that 
it takes into consideration several variables and that it includes 28 countries, the data might not be available 
for the entire range. In the table below, we present the dataset used for each country and for each of the three 
important stages of our analysis: identifying the Fiscal adjustments episodes; establishing the Threshold for CAB 
and Debt; establishing the final scores for the overall Vulnerability.  
Country Period Country Period 
Fiscal 
adjustment 
Threshold Vulnerability Fiscal 
adjustment 
Threshold Vulnerability 
CAB Debt CAB Debt 
Belgium 1990:2013 1990:2013 1990:2013 1992:2013 Lithuania 1997:2013 1998:2013 1995:2013 1999:2013 
Bulgaria 2002:2013 2002:2013 1997:2013 2003:2013 Luxembourg 1990:2013 1990:2013 1990:2013 1992:2013 
Czech 
Republic 
1997:2013 1997:2013 1995:2013 1999:2013 Hungary 1997:2013 1997:2013 1995:2013 1999:2013 
Denmark 1990:2013 1990:2013 1990:2013 1992:2013 Malta 1995:2013 1995:2013 1995:2013 1997:2013 
Germany 1990:2013 1990:2013 1991:2013 1993:2013 The 
Netherlands 
1990:2013 1990:2013 1990:2013 1992:2013 
Estonia 1995:2013 1995:2013 1995:2013 1997:2013 Austria 1990:2013 1990:2013 1990:2013 1992:2013 
Ireland 1990:2013 1990:2013 1990:2013 1992:2013 Poland 1995:2013 1995:2013 1995:2013 1997:2013 
Greece 1990:2013 1990:2013 1990:2013 1992:2013 Portugal 1990:2013 1990:2013 1990:2013 1992:2013 
Spain 1995:2013 1995:2013 1990:2013 1997:2013 Romania 2002:2013 2002:2013 1995:2013 2004:2013 
France 1990:2013 1990:2013 1990:2013 1980:2013 Slovenia 1998:2013 1998:2013 1995:2013 2000:2013 
Croatia 2009:2013 2009:2013 2009:2013 2011:2013 Slovakia 1997:2013 1997:2013 1995:2013 1999:2013 
Italy 1990:2013 1990:2013 1990:2013 1986:2013 Finland 1990:2013 1990:2013 1990:2013 1992:2013 
Cyprus 1998:2013 1998:2013 1995:2013 2000:2013 Sweden 1993:2013 1993:2013 1994:2013 1996:2013 
Latvia 1997:2013 1997:2013 1995:2013 1999:2013 UK 1990:2013 1990:2013 1990:2013 1992:2013 
 
 
